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INTRODUCTION
Theodore J. St. Antoine*
The desirability of union democracy is generally regarded
today as a self-evident proposition. In this Symposium Clyde
Summers treats it as a "fundamental premise."' But there
have always been reputable scholars who would support the
thesis, in greater or lesser degree, that "democracy is as
inappropriate within the international headquarters of the
UAW as it is in the front office of General Motors."2
Part of the problem, of course, lies in the use of that slippery
term, "democracy." If one merely means such rights as free
speech, the choice of qualified leaders, and guarantees against
intimidation and corruption, there is hardly room for dissent.
If one wishes to transform labor organizations into latter-day
versions of the storied town meeting, however, with every
determination open for full debate and membership vote, then
serious difficulties develop. In some of its quintessential
activities, a union is more akin to a military organization than
a civil polity, and a failure to recognize that will operate only
to the union's detriment.3 Contrary to much populist rhetoric,
few rank-and-file workers have the time or inclination to
master the data necessary for wholly independent judgments
on the making of industrial war and peace. Union members'
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B.,
Fordham College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954.
1. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
689, 689 (1991).
2. Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy, 12
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 503, 525 (1959); see also R. HOXIE, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 177 (2d ed. 1936) ("natural and necessary" that power "centers in the
hands of officers and leaders"); S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION
DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION
403 (1956) ("[Tlhe functional requirements for democracy cannot be met most of the
time in most unions ... ."); D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 91 (1970) ("[T]he question should be, not whether any given change will
make the union more democratic, but whether it will serve the ends of the modern
union-to respond to the interests of the membership, to promote them effectively
... ."); 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAw 210 (2d ed. 1977) ('[I]f union democ-
racy is understood as giving effective rule- and decision-making powers to mass
meetings then it will ... produce a smile or a smirk on the faces of the augurs .... ).
3. For a classic statement of a union's dual nature as "army" and "town
meeting," see Muste, Factional Fights in Trade Unions, in AMERICAN LABOR
DYNAMICS 332, 332-33 (J. Hardman ed. 1928).
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more sensible and constructive role in conflict situations is to
serve as checkreins on the exercise of unbridled discretion by
their elected leadership.
It is no secret that the principal push in Congress for federal
union-democracy legislation, in the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,' and
particularly its Title I, the "Bill of Rights,"5 came from a
conservative coalition that was less concerned with promoting
the individual rights of working people than with blunting the
economic effectiveness of labor unions. Harvard Law School
Professor Archibald Cox, who served as technical advisor to
John Kennedy, floor manager of the bill in the Senate, put it
bluntly:
Business groups showed no genuine interest in [union]
reform. Spokesmen for such groups as the United States
Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers beat the drums in an effort to swell the
public outcry against the abuses revealed at the McClellan
hearings in order to obtain support for laws which would
strengthen the bargaining power of management in
relation to labor organizations.6
Thus, while I applaud both the Journal and the Association
for Union Democracy for arranging this Symposium, as well as
the March 17, 1990 conference on which it is based, I must
introduce some cautionary words. My first point would
probably not be disputed by any participant in the Sympo-
sium. I state it only for the purposes of emphasis and
perspective. The major problem confronting the labor move-
ment in the 1990s is not a matter of governance; it is a
matter of survival, or at least survival as a significant
institution in American society. Union membership has
declined steadily since the 1960s, from a high of 34.7 percent
4. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1988)).
5. 73 Stat. 519, 522 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1988)).
6. Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1959); see also Dunau, Some Comments on the Bill of
Rights of Members of Labor Organizations, 14 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 77, 77-78 (1961);
cf. Taft, Reflections on the Present State of the Labor Movement, 14 ANN. INDUS. REL.
RES. A. PROC. 2, 6-7 (1961).
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of the employed work force in 19547 to 16.1 percent in 1990.'
I do not mean to belittle the concern of this Symposium about
the quality of American unionism; indeed, that quality could
have a direct bearing on the continuing viability of the
institution. Yet, at a time when organized labor is under
siege, realistic priorities may call for greater efforts to
preserve the vitality of the movement as a whole than to
ensure the purity of its every part.
Second, and perhaps much more important as a practical
matter, the present Symposium, excellent as are its individual
components, could easily mislead the casual reader about the
pressing day-to-day issues of union democracy. Those issues
are not the imposition of trusteeships over union locals, or the
deferral by the National Labor Relations Board of employees'
unfair labor practice charges to the grievance and arbitration
procedures established under collective-bargaining agree-
ments, or even the institution of lawsuits by the government
or private parties against Mafia-ridden unions under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 9 (RICO).
In short, the subject matter of this Symposium is atypical if
not aberrational. It involves either egregious transgressions
of law, of the sort that have largely been confined to four or
five international unions, or substantial breakdowns in the
traditional triangular relationship that exists among unions,
employers, and employees.
For the past eighteen years I have been a member of the
United Automobile Workers' Public Review Board. The PRB
consists of seven impartial outsiders-currently, five labor law
professors, one industrial relations professor, and, as chair, a
cleric long associated with social action programs-who pass
upon claims by UAW members that the union has deprived
them of democratic rights and procedures in some fashion.1 °
7. BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T LAB., RELEASE NO. 91-34, UNION
MEMBERS IN 1990 (Feb. 6, 1991).
8. Union Membership Down to 16.1 Percent, 136 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 174 (Feb.
18, 1991).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
10. For a fuller discussion of the Public Review Board, see Oberer, Voluntary
Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MICH. L. REV. 55, 56 (1959); Klein,
Public Review Boards: Their Place in the Process of Dispute Resolutions, 27 ANN.
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PRoc. 189 (1975); Linn, The American Federation of Teachers
Public Review Board, 27 ANN. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. PROC. 205 (1975); Feller, The
Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers Public Review Board, 27 ANN. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. PROC. 221 (1975).
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We meet nearly every month and decide about thirty cases
each year. In most instances we find no union violation. The
usual problem areas include local election improprieties, e.g.,
incumbent officers campaigning on paid union time, and
misapplications of disciplinary standards and procedures. We
also receive a number of complaints that the union has
breached its duty of fair representation in the processing of
members' grievances, but only a handful of such charges have
been sustained. Almost never do I encounter conduct that I
would say comes close to "shocking the conscience." Now, I
recognize that the UAW is one of the "cleanest," most respon-
sible of American unions. It is also the only one to have had
a "public review board" for any substantial period of time.
Nonetheless, my best judgment is that the behavior of the
UAW is much closer to that of the mainstream of the labor
movement than most of the examples cited in the papers that
follow.
Finally, lest I seem too cavalier and unappreciative of the
very substantial contributions by the participants in this
Symposium, let me deal briefly with their presentations on
their own terms. Clyde Summers can fairly be described as
the godparent (after reading his piece, no one will doubt why
I refrain from saying "godfather!") of the modern law of union
democracy. Over the years, a series of classic articles by him
has been of inestimable influence in setting the judicial and
legislative agendas in this area. 1  In this Symposium
Summers tackles the troubling task of trying "to reconcile
union democracy and government trusteeship" over mob-
dominated labor organizations. 2 While he finds the trustee-
ship device "distasteful and disturbing,"3 he ultimately
concludes that it is justified in extreme situations when
democracy in a particular union is already "dead."" Further-
more, he argues that the court decree establishing the
trusteeship "should state explicitly that the trusteeship will
continue for as long as is needed to reestablish the democratic
11. See, e.g., Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960); Summers, The Impact of Landrum-Griffin in State
Courts, 13 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 333 (1960); Summers, American Legislation for
Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 273 (1962); Summers, The Individual Employee's
Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977).
12. Summers, supra note 1, at 691.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 694.
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process."1" Only after closely supervised, truly free elections
should union autonomy be restored. If trusteeships have not
worked as effectively as hoped, Summers insists it is "not
because judicial intervention has reached too far, but because
it has been too limited and too quickly withdrawn." 6
Randy Mastro, Steven Bennett, and Mary Donlevy provide
a comprehensive account of the federal government's use of
civil RICO actions against unions plagued by "systematic
corruption" in some ten leading cases during the two decades
since the statute's enactment. 7 Private litigants should now
be able to draw upon this body of precedent, the authors
contend, to forge a powerful new tool to reshape corrupted
labor unions through private RICO suits. I expressed some
skepticism earlier about the soundness of any judgment that
would place internal union reform at the top of the priority list
of the problems of organized labor in the 1990s. But I must
acknowledge that the rehabilitation of any human institution
is probably going to call for strong medication administered by
persons who are not necessarily the institution's most loyal
and ardent supporters. The latter are all too likely to be
defensive and compromising rather than bold and aggressive.
So, despite my reservations, I find considerable merit in the
authors' stern prescription. Yet, I would continue to stress,
disruptive RICO actions should be entertained only as a last
resort, when the courts are satisfied that an organization is a
union in name alone, and just an extension of the rackets in
reality.
The two Symposium articles on the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's policy of "deferral" to arbitration-one by Paul
Alan Levy and the other by Leonard Page and Daniel
Sherrick-return us from the dark underworld of the Mafia
and its hit men to the workaday life of unions, employers,
and employees, attempting to resolve their disputes in a
peaceful and orderly manner. The deferral problem arises
because of a frequent overlap between statutory rights under
the National Labor Relations Act and contractual rights under
a collective-bargaining agreement. For example, sections
15. Id. at 701.
16. Id. at 705.
17. Mastro, Bennett & Donlevy, Private Plaintiffs' Use of Equitable Remedies
Under the RICO Statute: A Means to Reform Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 571 (1991).
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8(a)(3) and (b)(2) 18 forbid employer and union discrimination
against employees. Many labor agreements contain a similar
guarantee. Similarly, section 8(a)(5)' 9 forbids an employer to
refuse to bargain with the union representing its employees,
and section 8(d)20 defines that duty to bargain as including
the employer's obligation to keep in force the terms of an
existing labor contract. At the same time, however, Congress
did not make breaches of collective agreements as such unfair
labor practices subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB;
instead, it left the enforcement of union-employer contracts to
"the usual processes of the law."
21
The vast majority of collective-bargaining agreements
provide that disputes about their interpretation and applica-
tion will be decided through grievance and arbitration proce-
dures established by the contracts. In the case of many
section 8(a)(3), (a)(5), and (b)(2) violations, therefore, an
employee or a union would seem on the face of it to have an
option to pursue either unfair labor practice charges under the
statute or a grievance claim under the contract. But in Collyer
Insulated Wire,22 where a union had alleged an employer had
violated section 8(a)(5) by certain unilateral changes in wages
and working conditions, the Labor Board held it would defer
to arbitration because the dispute arose under the parties'
contract and should be resolved as the contract prescribed.
Later, after vacillating on the issue, the Board extended this
deferral doctrine to 8(a)(3) and (b)(2) discrimination cases as
well.23
Paul Levy is counsel for the Public Citizen Litigation Group,
which has frequently represented individual employees
against both unions and employers. Understandably, he
argues that the NLRB is abdicating its responsibility when it
defers to contractual arbitration procedures to resolve what in
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1988).
19. Id. § 158(a)(5).
20. Id. § 158(d).
21. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at
505, 546 (1948).
22. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1971).
23. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559-60 (1984), overruling
General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), overruling National Radio Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). The Board retains the power, however, to review the
validity of the result reached in arbitration. United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at
560.
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effect are statutory claims of discrimination prohibited by
section 8(a)(3) and (b)(2). The practical problem for the
dissident member, as Levy sees it, is the grave risk that the
organization will betray the dissident in the arbitration
proceedings. As a subsidiary matter, Levy maintains that at
least the Board should not continue deferring to such "joint"
union-employer arbitration tribunals as those sponsored by
the Teamsters Union, which operate without even the involve-
ment of an impartial third party.
Page and Sherrick are counsel for the UAW. Despite the
obvious client concerns that might tilt them otherwise, they
largely agree with Levy that the NLRB has erred in routinely
deferring to arbitration in cases of individual employee
discrimination charges. As could be expected, the authors are
especially incensed when discrimination charges against an
employer are deferred. It can certainly be argued that when
a union secures a contract clause forbidding the same kind of
discrimination against employees as is forbidden by section
8(a)(3), that should be regarded as an added protection, not as
a waiver of the preexisting statutory right. Toward the end of
the Page-Sherrick piece, the demands of special pleading seem
to become too much to resist. Thus, the authors insist that
the NLRB should require an employee to exhaust a union's
internal remedies before processing a charge that the union
has breached its duty of fair representation. Urging the
requirement of such exhaustion is not frivolous; it promotes
the worthy objective of encouraging union self-policing. But
it does tend to diminish the force of the earlier argument
that there should be no deferral in instances of employer
discrimination.
The pros and cons of NLRB deferral are so nicely balanced,
on both doctrinal and policy grounds, that I doubt we shall
ever find a totally satisfactory solution. To complicate
matters, as the two fine Symposium articles make clear, the
issue can arise in a bewildering variety of factual situations,
far more than I have even hinted. Nonetheless, there are
some fundamental principles that will assist our analysis if
they are kept firmly in mind. The primary task of the Labor
Board is to interpret and apply statutory rights under the
NLRA, not contract rights. The primary task of arbitrators
is to interpret and apply contract rights under collective-
bargaining agreements, not statutory rights. When a labor
contract plainly covers a question that is central to resolving
Introduction 475
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a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge, Board deferral to
arbitration is generally going to be appropriate. Not only does
this reflect proper respect for the special (or assumed) exper-
tise of the parties' chosen arbiter; more often than not the
rights at stake are truly group or collective rights, the product
of union-employer contract negotiations.
On the other hand, if an individual employee is charging
discrimination under section 8(a)(3) or (b)(2), she is claiming
a violation that exists wholly independent of contract, to which
any contractual claim may arguably be just supplemental, and
which may actually implicate the employee's union as a
possible offender. Such individual claims, I believe, should not
be subject to deferral, at least in the absence of the clearest
and most unmistakable waiver on the part of the bargaining
agent. And, naturally, any alleged waiver needs the closest
scrutiny to ensure that employee rights are not subtly sub-
verted. There should probably be a flat policy, for example,
against deferral when the employee's union is a charged
party.
24
Paul Levy believes the NLRB simply does not have the legal
"power" to defer unfair labor practice charges to arbitration.
He relies on section 10(a) of the NLRA, which provides that
the Board's "power [to prevent ULPs] shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise."25 But
of course the Board is not suggesting that its "power" is dimin-
ished through deferral; it still has the capacity to act. The
Board is merely withholding the assertion of its authority in
order to advance other policies, such as the private self-
correction of wrongdoing through voluntary means. The
recent en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit in Hammontree v.
NLRB 26 endorses the Board's position. My hunch is the
Supreme Court would agree. But respecting the Board's
24. Cf. Laborers Local 294, 275 N.L.R.B. 278, 287-88 (1985) (ALJ decision)
(finding, in a case under sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2), that "deferral to the grievance-
arbitration machinery of the governing collective-bargaining agreements is
inappropriate... because of the conflicting interests of the aggrieved employees and
Respondent Unions"); Iron Workers Local 433, 266 N.L.R.B. 154, 162 (1983) (ALJ
decision) (finding, in an 8(b)(1)(A) case, that "in this case which ... involves a clear
conflict of interest between [the employee] and the Union .... deferral is ...
inappropriate").
25. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
26. 925 F.2d 1486, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (one judge dissenting).
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(quite fluctuating) exercise of discretion as a matter of law
does not necessarily mean it has made all the right policy
determinations.
In fulfilling the modest assignment of writing an Introduc-
tion for a set of essays, I usually do not ramble on as long as
I have here. For all my carping about this point or that point,
that is a measure of my regard for the authors and their
accomplishment. If they have gone farther afield in search of
subject matter than I might have proposed, they have also
had the courage to get off the beaten path and to plunge deep
into difficult and troubling terrain. The result is a signal
contribution to our understanding of two substantial but often
neglected areas of union democracy.

